



Hidden Security Threats in Oracle E-Business Suite

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Speakers


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- Founder of ERP Risk Advisors and Oracle User Best Practices Board
- 14 years working with Oracle EBS as client and consultant
- Experience includes Big 4 audit, 6 years in CFO/Controller roles – both as auditor and auditee
- Author Oracle E-Business Suite Controls: Application Security Best Practices


Stephen Kost Integrigy Corporation

- CTO and Founder
- 16 years working with Oracle and 14 years focused on Oracle security
- DBA, Apps DBA, technical architect, IT security, ...
- Integrigy Consulting Oracle EBS security assessments and services
- Integrigy AppSentry Oracle EBS Security Assessment and Audit


About Integrigy












Threat

Application user passwords may be **decrypted** and multiple other user accounts may be used to circumvent application controls.



Oracle EBS Password Encryption

FND_USER Table

USER_NAME	ENCRYPTED_FOUNDATION_PASSWORD	ENCRYPTED_USER_PASSWORD	
GUEST	ZG 6EBD472D1208B0CDC78D7EC7730F9B249496F825 E761BA3EB2FEBB54F6915FADA757EF4558CF438CF55D 23FE32BE0BE52E	ZG ₆ C08D49D524A1551A3068977328B1AFD26040 0FB598E799A3A8BAE573777E7EE7262D1730366E6 709524C95EC6BFA0DA06	
SYSADMIN	ZH _{39A396EDCA4CA7C8D5395D94D8C915510C0C90DA 198EC9CDA15879E8B547B9CDA034575D289590968F1B 6B38A1E654DD98}	ZH F57EAF37B1936C56755B134DE7C83AE40CADD D4AA83B1D7455E5533DC041773B494D2AA04644FB 5A514E5C5614F3C87888	
WIZARD	ZG _{2744DCFCCFFA381B994D2C3F7ADACF68DF433BAD F59CF6C3DAB3C35A11AAAB2674C2189DCA040C4C81D2 CE41C2BB82BFC6}	ZG E9AAA974FB46BC76674510456C739564546F2 A0154DCF9EBF2AA49FBF58C759283C7E288CC6730 44036E284042A8FE4451	
	APPS password encrypted user name + user password	User password encrypted using APPS password	

Password Decryption SQL – APPS Password

SELECT

```
(SELECT get pwd.decrypt (UPPER
               ((SELECT UPPER (fnd_profile.VALUE)
                 ('GUEST USER PWD')) FROM DUAL)),
                fu.encrypted_foundation_password)
        FROM DUAL) AS apps_password
FROM fnd user fu
WHERE fu.user name LIKE UPPER
       ((SELECT
         SUBSTR (fnd_profile.VALUE ('GUEST_USER_PWD') ,1 ,
         INSTR (fnd_profile.VALUE ('GUEST_USER_PWD'), '/') - 1 )
         FROM DUAL))
```

Google: oracle applications password decryption

Oracle EBS Password Decryption

 Application passwords by default are encrypted, not hashed which is more secure

Simple method to decrypt if able to access FND_USER table

 Secure hashing of passwords is optional and must be enabled by DBA

Patch for earlier 11i versions and included with R12 but disabled by default

Encrypted application passwords are cloned to test and development databases

See Integrigy whitepaper for recommendations

Password Decryption Recommendations

***** Be sure password hashing is enabled by DBAs

DBAs must run FNDCPASS USERMIGRATE (MOS ID 457166.1) Verify it has been run successfully for all user (MOS ID 1084956.1)


Change all application user passwords when cloning from production to test and development

All environment credentials should be changed during clones Enable forgot password functionality for accessing passwords

Enable strong application password controls in all Oracle EBS environments

Prevents possible brute forcing of application password hashes





 Profile Options can be set through the System Profile Values form:

System Profile Values	🖸 Find System Profile Values 📃 🗖	_ = ×
Profile Option Name	Display Display Site Application	User
	Responsibility Server (B) Organization	
	□ User □ User □ Profiles with No Values	·
	Profile	
h	Find <u>C</u> lear	

 Profile Options can also be set through the User Profile Values form:

Profile Name	Default Value	User Value	
%VVSH%][]		
@JL : Perform Inflation Adjustme	ır []		
ABM: ABM Analyzer Help	/OA_DOC/abmaug1110.pdt		
ABM: ABM Help	/OA_DOC/abmug1110.pdf		
ABM: Dark Color RGB String			
ABM: Java Currency Format Strin	(###,####,####0.00000		
ABM: Java Date Format String	dd-MMM-yyyy		
ABM: Java Date-Time Format Str	ir dd-MMM-yyyy hh:mm:ss		
ABM: Java Numeric Format String	g ##,###,###,##O.######		
ABM: Light Color RGB String			
ABM: Look And Feel Class			

Risks:

- Override of controls via the User Profile
 Values form
- Changes to System Profile Options that are not analyzed / approved by appropriate personnel
- System profile options are not set to meet control objectives or operational objectives
 – which may be in conflict

8907 profile options in this R12 instance

Name	IGS_DA_XML_VV3C_	REF		
Application	Student System			
User Profile Name	IGS: XML Degree Aud	dit W3C URI		
Description	WC3 XML Schema S	tandards		
Hierarchy Type	Security		·]
Hierarchy Type	Access Level			Active Dates
		Visible	Updatable	Start 15-MAY-2003
	Site	>		End
	Application Responsibility	~		
	Server			User Access
	Server+Responsibility			✓ visible
	Organization User			
	User	•		✓ Updatable
	d for the Profile Option'	2 2101 01 1 44		
				<u>Open</u>

• Example:

Profiles				
Application User Profile Name	GL_JRNL_REVW_RE General Ledger GL: Journal Review Re Journal review required	equired	ting	
Hierarchy Type	Security			-
Hierarchy Type A	Access Level Site Application Responsibility Server Server+Responsibility Organization User	Visible V V U	Updatable V V U	Active Dates Start 01-JAN-1951 End User Access ✓ Visible ✓ Updatable
	e = 'YES_NO'''		ies	

• Example:


 Navigator - Application Develope Functions Documents P Other: Profile Set profile options 	Default Value	User Value	
 + Flexfield + Concurrent + Application Profile + Attachments Other + Requests Profile Concurrent Change Organization 			

- Control expectations user profile values:
 - Access to the form is totally removed or
 - Personalization is done to restrict access to just those profile options that are low risk

- Control expectations overall:
 - A risk assessment has been performed to identify which profile options should be subject to the change management process, or all profile option changes are subject to the change management process
 - The change management documentation clearly identifies the profile options that are subject to the change management process or states that all profile option changes are subject to the change management process

- Control expectations overall:
 - A log-based or trigger-based auditing solution has been deployed to build a detailed audit trail of profile option changes
 - A quality assurance process is in place that tests for unauthorized changes by tracing actual changes back to approved changes
 - Testing of the change management process is performed to verify that the procedures have been followed and properly documented – approvals obtained, etc






- Represents 'back door' access to tables
- Enabled through Utilities: Diagnostics profile option

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Global Name JTH Test Description Inactive Date Address Details Conta Ship-To Locatio	About Qracle Applications	Display Database Error Examine Logging Test Web Agent Țrace Debug Properties Custom Code Client System Analyzer	 <
Extra Inform		-To Site mal Site	[]]

Risks:

- Back door access to maintain data not visible through forms such as IDs
- Corruption of data

 Risks: Back door access to maintain data not visible through forms such as IDs



• Example – before:

С	Location			_ 🗆 ×	1
		Scope ⊙ <u>G</u> lobal	⊖L <u>o</u> cal		
	Name	JTH Test			
	Description				
	Inactive Date			Legal Address 🗖	
	Address Details Shippin	ng Details	Other Details		
	Address Style	United St	ates (International)	OAbout This Record	×
	Address	12345 Ha	ppy LaneUnited	Freated By: JEFF.HARE	
	Timezone			Creation Date: 13-MAR-2013 12:19:03	
				Table Name: HR_LOCATIONS_V	13
				Jpdated By: JEFF.HARE	12
				Update Date: 13-MAR-2013 12:19:03 System Logon: UNKNOWN	'
				Terminal: UNKNOWN	
	Extra Inform				
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	· Octop			(<u> </u>	
	Requests			\	

• Example – change made:


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	Scope © <u>G</u> lobal	⊖ L <u>o</u> cal					
Name	JTH Test						
Description							
Inactive Date				Legal Address 🛛			
Address Details Shippir	ig Details	Other Details					
Address Style	United Sta	ates (Internationa	n 🗖 E	a ta an manada a sa an Albanda a ta ba Alba	- 1		
Address	1 Fraudule	ent Address	Exam	nine Field and Variable V	aiues		×
Timezone			Block	LOC			
			Field	ADDRESS_LINE_1			
			Value	1 Fraudulent Addres	ŝ		
E <u>x</u> tra Inform					Q	K <u>C</u> a	ancel

• Example – after:

							1	
Location						_ [
		Scope • <u>G</u> lobal	⊖Local					
	Name	JTH Test						
	Description							
	Inactive Date			L	egal Address 🗆			
Address D	etails Shippin	g Details	Other Details				_	
	Address Style	United St	ates (International)	O About	This Record			×
	Address Timezone	1 Fraudul	ent AddressU	Cicale	d By: JEFF.HARI on Date: 13-MAR-			
				Update Update System	Name: HR_LOCA ed By: JEFF.HAR e Date: 13-MAR-2 m Legen: UNKNO	E 013 12:40:04]	2002
				Termir	al: UNKNOWN			◄
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	Requests							

- Recommendations:
 - Do not allow in Prod for ANYONE other than those that already have access to the APPS password.
 - See more recommendations related to profile options in earlier section on profile options






MOS 1334930.1 Sensitive Administrative Pages in Oracle E-Business Suite

Some **forms** and **pages** in Oracle E-Business Suite allow a user to modify the functionality of the applications by specifying values such as **SQL statements**, **SQL fragments** such as WHERE clauses, HTML strings, and **operating system commands** or environment variables.

Threat

Non-privileged users may be able to execute SQL as the APPS database account or operating system commands as the database owner.



Forms that Allow SQL (Partial Listing)

- Applications
- Attribute Mapping
- Attribute Mapping Details
- Audit Statements
- Business Rule Workbench
- Create QuickPaint Inquiry
- Custom Stream Advanced Setup
- Defaulting Rules
- Define Assignment Set
- Define Data Group
- Define Data Stream
- Define Descriptive Flexfield Segments
- Define Dynamic Resource Groups
- Define Function
- Define Pricing Formulas

- Define Pricing Formulas
- Define Security Profile
- Define Validation Templates
- Define Value Set
- Define WMS Rules
- Dynamic Trigger Maintenance
- Foundation Objects
- PL/SQL tester
- QA Collection Plan Workbench
- Register Oracle IDs
- SpreadTable Diagnostics Form
- Spreadtable Metadata Administration
- Workflow Activity Approval Configuration Framework
- Workflow Process
 Configuration Framework
- Write Formula

Sensitive Administrative Pages


 Sensitive forms and pages often not given appropriate emphasis in SOD matrices

Review SOD matrices to verify all functions are listed

- Oracle listings of sensitive forms and pages are not complete due to the complexity of the application
 Very difficult to identify every possible form and page
- User access at the function level must be reviewed to identify priviliege violations


Use Oracle provided SQL script to get a listing of function access





Threat

Default or weak database passwords may allow unauthorized access to the database. Almost every database account can have privileged access.



*Google: oracle password cracker



- Oracle Database password algorithm published
 - Oracle 11g hash changed to
 SHA-1 old DES hash also stored
- Hash is unique to the username, but common across all versions and platforms of the Oracle database
 - SYSTEM/MANAGER is always
 D4DF7931AB130E37 in every
 Oracle database in the world
- Database password hashes cloned to development



300+ database accounts by default

- One account for each module (GL=GL) and a few extras (APPS)
- Default password for almost all accounts is the username
- Every EBS database account has significant privileges
- A new database account is added for each new product module during an upgrade or patching
 - R12.1 upgrade = CA, DDR, DNA, DPP, FTP, GMO, IBW, INL, IPM, ITA, JMF, MTH, PFT, QPR, RRS, ...

Default Oracle Password Statistics

Database Account	Default Password	Exists in Database %	Default Password %
SYS	CHANGE_ON_INSTALL	100%	3%
SYSTEM	MANAGER	100%	4%
DBSNMP	DBSNMP	99%	52%
OUTLN	OUTLN	98%	43%
MDSYS	MDSYS	77%	18%
ORDPLUGINS	ORDPLUGINS	77%	16%
ORDSYS	ORDSYS	77%	16%
XDB	CHANGE_ON_INSTALL	75%	15%
DIP	DIP	63%	19%
WMSYS	WMSYS	63%	12%
CTXSYS	CTXSYS	54%	32%

* Sample of 120 production databases

Brute Forcing Database Passwords

A number of efficient password brute forcing programs exist for Oracle

- Speed is at least 1 million passwords per second for desktop/laptop
- Speed is around 100 million passwords per second for specialized hardware (FGPA/GPU)
- Only the username and hash are required
- Estimated time to brute force a password of x length –

Length	Permutations	<u> Time (desktop)</u>	<u> Time (GPU)</u>
1	26 (26)	0 seconds	0 seconds
2	1,040 (26 x 39)	0 seconds	0 seconds
3	40,586 (26 x 39 x 39)	0 seconds	0 seconds
4	1,582,880	1.5 seconds	0 seconds
5	61,732,346	2 minute	6 seconds
6	2,407,561,520	40 minutes	24 seconds
7	93,894,899,306	1 day	15 minutes
8	3,661,901,072,960	42 days	10 hours
9	142,814,141,845,466	1,600 days	16 days

How to Check Database Passwords


Use Oracle's DBA_USERS_WITH_DEFPWD

- Limited set of accounts
- Single password for each account
- Command line tools (orabf, etc.)
 Difficult to run command line only

AppSentry

- Checks all database accounts
- Uses passwords lists > 1 million passwords
- Allows custom passwords





Conclusions

- Security is complicated, not a one time event, and ever-changing
- Oracle's security documents cannot be relied upon as complete

Upcoming Webinars

Sensitive Administrative Pages in Oracle EBS: Are You Overlooking This Threat Wednesday, April 24th, 2013 2:00pm EDT www.integrigy.com/upcoming-events

Oracle EBS Account Password Decryption Threat Explored Thursday, May 23rd, 2013 2:00m EDT www.integrigy.com/upcoming-events

Resources

Integrigy's Website	www.integrigy.com Oracle EBS Security Whitepapers and Blog	
ERP Risk Advisors Oracle Internal Controls and Security List Server	http://groups.yahoo.com/group/OracleSox	
ERP Risk Advisors Internal Controls Repository	http://tech.groups.yahoo.com/group/oracleappsi nternalcontrols	
Jeff's Book	Oracle E-Business Suite Controls: Application Security Best Practices [Amazon]	
Oracle Support Security Notes (MOS)	Security Configuration	189367.1 – 11i 403537.1 – R12
	DMZ Configuration	287176.1 – 11i 380490.1 – R12

Other Resources

- Recorded webinars at:
- <u>http://www.erpra.net/WebinarAccessPage.html</u>
- Free 10,000 assessment from ERP Risk Advisors. Details at: <u>www.erpra.net</u>

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